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PROHIBITION

A. Type of Administrative Action Subject to Control by
Writ of Prohibition

T

IIE WRIT of prohibition goes back to the very beginnings of the

Anglo-Norman writ system and is found both in the celebrated
treati-se of Glanvil 370 and the earliest extant manuscript copies of
the Register of W~rrits.37 7 Originally its function was to prevent
ecclesiastical courts from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the
royal justices ' ;s and only subsequently it became a means to keep
inferior courts from usurping jurisdiction. 3 7 9 The common law writ
*For prior installments, see 33 Minn. L. Rev. 569, 685 (1949). The final
installment on quo warranto, injunctions and declaratory judgments is

scheduled to appear in the December issue.
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
***Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
**;*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
376. Glanvill, , De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae, book 12 c.
21 and 22 (Woodbine 1932).
377. De Haas, An Early Thirteenth-CenturyRegister of Writs, 7 U. of
Toronto L. J. 196, 214 (1947) ; see also Maitland, The History of the Register of Original Writs, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 114 (1889).
378. Cf. Adams, The Writ of Prohibitionto Court Christiom, 20 Minn. L.
Rev.272 (1936).
379. Thus in 4 Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 452 (1764),
sutbzoce Prohibition, the law is stated as follows: "If courts exceed their
jurisdiction a prohibition may be granted to them. And this, to temporal as
well as spiritual courts. As if a Court Baron, County Court etc. or other
inferior Court in a city, borough etc. hold a plea of a matter out of the
limits of their jurisdiction, a prohibition may be granted." Similarly, Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium 39, 88 (1686 ed.).
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thus had as its field of applica :ion the preservation of the jurisdictional boundaries of the various tribunals.
As administrative tribunals became recognized in the legal
system the writ was also resorted to for the purpose of restraining
them from adjudicating subject matters outside their competency.
The development was thus in that respect completely analagous to
58
that discussed above with reference to the writ of certiorari.3
This
similarity was clearly enunciated by Lord Atkin in a leading English case 38 already mentioned. 3

2

Said the learned Lord Justice:

"I can see no difference in principle between certiorari and prohibition, except that the latter may be invoked at an earlier stage."-'
The American jurisdictions followed in general the English pattern.

384

The type of action subject to judicial control by means of the
writ of prohibition in Minnesota conforms with the general common law pattern. The governing statute furnishes at the most a
very vague definition of the scope of applicability of the writ by
providing that the writ "command [s] the court and party or officers
to whom it is directed to refrain from any further proceeding in the
action or matter." [Italics added.] 8s5 The italicized words which
extended the writ beyond court proceedings in the strict sense were
added to the original wording of the Revised Statutes of 1851311
7
by an amendment passed in the year subsequent to their passage.-_
The applicability of the writ to action by public officers alleged
to be illegal and the significance of the amendment of 1852 first
came before the court in the early leading case of Home Insurance
Company of St. Paul v. Flint.3s8 In that case an insurance company made an application for a writ of prohibition commanding the
380. Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action by Mleans of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 33 Minn. L.
Rev. 569, 685-686 (1949).
381. Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K. B. 171 (C.A. 1923).
382. Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, supra note 380, at 702.
383. Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K. B. 171, 206 (C.A.
1923). Through oversight the quoted statement was attributed to the wrong
Lord Justice of Appeal in the previous installment.
384. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Embracing
Mandamus, Quo Warranto and Prohibition, especially at 708 (3d ed. 1896).
But note that the author relies heavily on Minnesota precedents.
385. Minn. Stat. § 587.01 (1949).
386. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1851 c. 83 § 18 (1852). This section was derived verbatim from Wis. Rev. Stat. 1849 c. 129 § 9, which in turn was
copied from 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. 1829 pt. III c. IX § 61. See Riesenfeld,
Bauman & Maxwell, supra note 380, at 573.
387. Minn. Amendments to the Revised Statutes § 64 (1852).
388. 13 Minn. 244 (1868).
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county attorney for Ramsey county to refrain from examining the
financial condition of the relator under a statute authorizing such
investigation in order to test the constitutionality of the act. Chief
Justice Wilson, speaking for the court observed:
"Our statute confirms the use of the writ, but has not in respect to the proceedings sought to be restrained by it changed the
common law; nor does it purport to limit, extend, or determine
the cases in which the writ will lie. If therefore, the acts of the
defendant complained of are not judicial, they cannot be reSome stress is laid by plaintiff's counstrained by this writ ....
Admitting that this amendsel on the amendment of 1852....

ment by implication justifies the issuing of a writ to an officer,
not properly a court, its force or meaning cannot be extended
further, for there is nothing in its language to justify or give
the least color to the inference that acts not strictly judicial may
thus be restrained. The amendment is silent on this subject and
therefore the common law stands."38
On the basis of the principles thus stated the court held that the
examination and the issuance of the certificate under the statute did
not amount to the exercise of judicial power and that therefore compliance with the act on the part of the county attorney could not be
restrained by means of the writ of prohibition. It is most significant
that the learned Chief Justice concluded the opinion with the paragraph:
"If the plaintiff has suffered, or is in danger of suffering
from the threatened act of the defendant, he has mistaken his
remedy. 3"
The language used clearly suggests that in the opinion of the court
the complainant should have proceeded by injunction. The case
therefore immediately confronted the profession with one of the
most troublesome problems in this area-When can the plaintiff
proceed with the writ of prohibition, and when is an injunction
the appropriate remedy?
The view that a writ of probihition was allowed in Minnesota
"for the purpose of arresting the proceedings of an officer who is
not acting strictly as a court but ...

nevertheless, only to restrain

the exercise of judicial power" was repeated by the same justice
in another case decided during the same term. 9' While the term
"quasi-judicial" was not used in defining the office of the writ in
these early cases it made its appearance in the next important precedent mapping out the scope of applicability of the writ in Minne389. Id. at 246 and 248.
390. Id. at 248.
391. Dayton v. Paine, 13 Minn. 493 (1868).
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sota, viz., the case of State v. Young.-"2 The controversy there involved centered around the power of the legislature to create
a special body for the purpose of adjudicating the question of
whether or not the legislature had power to assume certain bond
obligations without submitting the question to a popular vote. The
governor appointed a number of district judges to sit as the tribunal
so created, but before it took any formal action on the issue its
jurisdiction was challenged by means of the writ of prohibition. On
the threshold of the decision the Supreme Court had to meet the
problem of whether the writ of prohibition was the appropriate
remedy for questioning the powers of the special tribunal. Chief
Justice Gilfillan, speaking for the court, held that the writ of prohibition was properly applied for:
"The writ of prohibition issues usually to courts, to keep
them within the limits of their jurisdiction. But it may also issue
to an officer, to prevent the unlawful exercise of judicial or
quasi judicial power; and the other reasons for it existing, we
see none why it should not issue to a person, or body of persons,
not being in law a court, nor strictly officers; as if the legislature should assume in an unconstitutional manner to create a
court of justice, and the person or persons appointed as its
judge or judges should enter upon the exercise of the judicial
function thus attempted to be conferred, the same reasons might
exist for arresting their action as exist in the case of a court
exceeding its jurisdiction. ' " 3
The opinion concluded the discussion of the applicability of the
writ with an enumeration of three conditions that must be fulfilleda statement which has been repeated over and over again in subsequent cases 39 4 -vi. :
"First,that the court, officer or person is about to exercise
judicial or quasi judicial power;
second, that the exercise of such power by such court, officer
or person is unauthorized by law;
third, that it will result in injury for which there is no other
adequate remedy." 395
Minnesota thus clearly arrived at the result that the same type of
administrative action is subject to review by the writ of prohibition
as is subject to review by certiorari.
Accordingly, it can be concluded that on principle the
same tests which have been developed as criteria for quasi-judicial
392. 29 Minn. 474, 9 N. W. 737 (1881).
393. Id. at 523, 9 N. W. 737, 738.
394. The statement was incorporated verbatim in the 3d edition of
High's famous treatise on the extraordinary remedies, see op. cit. supra note
384, at 708.
395. State v. Young, 29 Minn. 474, 523, 9 N. NV. 737, 738 (1881).
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action in the certiorari cases-" should serve the same function with
respect to the appropriateness of the writ of prohibition. The decisions fairly substantiate tlis position, although the court has not
always had smooth sailing and has run into baffling dilemmas.
These difficulties arose especially in the cases where the writ of
prohibition was invoked to challenge the unconstitutional delegation
of administrative functions-ministerial or quasi-legislative--to
courts, especially of special or limited jurisdiction. This problem
was first encountered in the already mentioned case of State v.
J'o1ng2
Y5 7 The merits of that controversy presented the question

of whether the legislature could confer upon a special tribunal the
duty to determine whether one of two mutually exclusive sections
in a statute was valid, with the effect that in the case of affirmative
decision this particular section was to become operative while in
the case of a negative decision the alternative provision was to control. The court in effect reached the somewhat perplexing result
that the exercise of such function was sufficiently legislative in substance to amount to an invalid delegation of legislative power but
sufficiently quasi-judicial in form to be challenged by means of the
writ of prohibition. A similar dilemma occurred again in the case
of State v. Shnons.° In that case an application for a writ of prohibition was made to restrain the judges of the district court for
Ramsey County from proceeding under an act of 1883,""9 upon a
petition for the incorporation of certain territory as a village. The
act was challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
powers to the judiciary. Justice Mitchell held on the merits that the
act was unconstitutional for the asserted reason because it imposed
upon the court the duty to decide whether public interests as determined by his views of expediency and public policy would be
subserved by the creation of a municipal corporation. Yet despite
this non-judicial character of the function as to the substance the
justice was constrained to hold that the function was "quasi-judicial" in forim and effect so as to be subject to control by prohibition. 4°0
The justice intimated that the relator had no other adequate remedy
396. For details see the discussion in Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell,
supra note 380, at 686 et. seq.
397. See note 392 supra.
398. 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W. 750 (1884).
399. An act to provide for the incorporation of villages, etc. Minn. Laws
1883 c. 73.
400. "Although the powers attempted to be conferred by this act are
not judicial in the strict sense of the term, yet they are in many of the features and results, quasi-judicial and are conducted under judicial forms," 32
Minn. 540, 544, 21 N. W. 750, 752 (1884).
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without discussing why the writ of quo warranto or perhaps an
injunction would not perform such function.
The case of State v. Simons is particularly illuminating if compared with the decision of State v. Ueland 0 1 decided only two years
earlier. In the latter case the writ of prohibition was applied for
to restrain the judge of probate of Hennepin County from proceeding under another statute 0 2 upon a petition for the incorporation of certain territory as a city. In that case the statute was challenged as conferring upon the probate courts judicial power beyond
that authorized by the constitution. In a curiously garbled opinion
Chief justice Gilfillan denied the writ for the reason that the functions imposed by the statute in question upon the judges of probate
were not judicial in character and therefore neither properly challenged by the writ of prohibition nor "obnoxious to the objection
made to it.' ' 403 The case is not only puzzling because of the apparent
acquiescence in a delegation of non-judicial duties to probate
judges4u 4 but also significant because of its emphasis on the necessity
of a concurrence of various criteria as to substance, effect and mode
to make a determination judicial in character. It is also perhaps
worth noting that this opinion which denied the writ made a special
point of the possibility that the order could be "properly called in
question" by quo warranto. °5
While the Supreme Court later apparently relaxed somewhat its
views on the type of duties which could be conferred upon the
courts without violating the phantom principle of the separation of
powers,40 6 it has consistently clung to the requirement that a pro401. 30 Minn. 29, 14 N. W. 58 (1882).
402. Minn. Gen. Stats. 1878 c. 10 § 124.
403. 30 Minn. 29, 31, 14 N. W. 58, 59 (1882).
404. This apparent acquiescense was later retracted and explained as
"a phase of the case that does not seem to have been suggested or considered." Foreman v. Board of County Commissioners, 64 Minn. 371, 372,
67 N. W. 207 (1896). See also State v. City of Nashwauk, 151 Minn. 534,
538, 186 N.W. 694, 696 (1922).
405. State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 29, 31, 14 N. W. 58, 59 (1882). The
writ of quo warranto was used successfully to challenge an incorporation
under the statute in question in State v. City of Nashwauk, 151 Minn. 534,
186 N. W. 694, 189 N. V. 592 (1922).
406. For cases indicating this trend of relaxation see Foreman v. Board
of County Commissioners, 64 Minn. 371, 372-373, 67 N. W. 207-208 (1896)
("The precise line of cleavage between judicial and ministerial functions never
has been, and never can be, definitely located. There are many duties which may
be either the one or the other, depending upon the officer or body performing
them, and the effect to be given to the action or determination of such
officer or body. When duties of this ambiguous or equivocal nature are
imposed upon a judicial officer or tribunal, to whom none but judicial duties
can be constitutionally assigned, the doubt should be solved in favor of the
validity of the statute, and the duties held to be judicial, and the presump-
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ceeding must be judicial or at least quasi-judicial in form and effect
to warrant its intercession by means of the writ of prohibition.
In application of this rule and in addition to the cases already
discussed 40 7 the writ of prohibition was held to be an inappropriate
remedy for the purpose of challenging as unauthorized or illegal
the taking of depositions by justices of the peace in an election
contest under a statute providing for such procedure, 40 8 the hold-

ing of an election by county commissioners to remove a county
seat 4u" and the placing of the name of a candidate for election on the
ballots by a county auditor and his certifying copies of voters'
certificates. 410 Conversely, the Supreme Court has either actually
found or at least intimated the requisite presence of a quasi- judicial
function upon application for a writ of prohibition for the purpose
of attacking the validity of proceedings before an administrative
tribunal to remove a public official from office, 411 of an election
tion indulged in that the legislature intended them to be performed in a
judicial manner") ; State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99 N. W. 636 (1904)
(constitutionality of statute empowering the district courts to lay out and
establish ditches and drains) ; State v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N. W. 709
(1905). But see also State v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 639
(1907) ; State v. City of Nashwauk, 151 Minn. 534, 186 N. W. 694, 189 N. W.
592 (1922).
407. Home Insurance Co. v. Flint, 13 Minn. 244 (1868), discussed
supra text to note 388; State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 29, 14 N. W. 58 (1882),
discussed supra text to note 401; State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N. W.
750 (1884), discussed supra text to note 398.
408. State v. Peers, 33 Minn. 81,21 N. W. 860 (1885). The court held that
the justices of the peace when taking depositions in an election contest under a
special statute were not exercising judicial functions but merely acting as commissioners of the legislature. It is, perhaps, surprising to note that not long
after, and in perfect cognizance of this decision, the court felt no embarrassment to hold that the appointment of election commissioners by district
judges under a later statute was "at least quasi judicial" and that consequently a refusal by them to make such appointment was subject to review by
certiorari, State v. Searle, 59 Minn. 489, 492, 61 N. W. 553, 554 (1894).
Still harder to explain is the fact that subsequently the court cited both
State v. Searle and State v. Peers side by side for the proposition that "the

character of the duties conferred upon judges and justices of the peace

in these contests, has been well stated" in these opinions, State v. Nelson,
141 Minn. 499, 501, 169 N. W. 788, 789 (1919). The final step in this sequence
of inconsistencies was reached when the court again characterized the statute
providing for the appointment of election officers by the district judges as
"grant of judicial jurisdiction," Williams v. Maas, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N. W.
586 (1936), and this despite the fact that in the interim it had held that
district judges could not be clothed with a power to appoint other public
officials because such function would be purely ministerial in nature, State
v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 639 (1907).
409. State v. Ostrom, 35 Minn. 480, 29 N. V. 585 (1886) (note that
the decision on the merits was specifically reserved).
410. O'Neill v. Kallsen, 222 Minn. 379, 24 N. W. 2d 715 (1946).
411. State v. Ward, 70 Minn. 58, 72 N. W. 825 (1897) (order to show
cause discharged because the tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction) ; Brandt
v. Thompson, 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W. 887 (1904) (writ of prohibition
granted).
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contest before an administrative tribuna 4 12 and of proceedings by
the state labor conciliator to determine the proper bargaining
agent.41 In the latter case the court found the quasi-judicial nature
in the following characteristics: "In a proceeding of this kind, the
labor conciliator, in a proper case investigates and finds facts and
draws conclusions of law from which he determines the legal rights
of the parties involved, consistent with the authority and power
414
vested in him by law."
B. Other Conditions for the Issuance of the Writ
In addition to the requirement that the action subject to review
by means of an application for the writ of prohibition must be of
judicial or quasi-judicial character the case law has firmly settled41
that three further essentials must be present:
(a) In the first place it is necessary that the judicial or quasijudicial proceedings are either imminent"" or already commenced
but still in progress. The writ is ordinarily not available to seek redress against a determination already completed. 417 As the Supreme
Court has stated succinctly and repeatedly: "[Prohibition] is by
nature a preventive, not a corrective, remedy.

' 41 8

Yet the court has

not felt this rule to be an obstacle to the issuance of a writ of prohibition for the purpose of annulling an unauthorized ex parte order
412. State v. Craig, 100 Mira. 352, 111 N. W. 3 (1907) (order to show
cause discharged because the tribunal possessed jurisdiction).
413. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn.
263, 35 N. IvV. 2d 337, 811 (1948).
414. Id. at 267, 35 N. W. 2d at 340.
415. The three essentials necessary for the issuance of the writ were
first laid down by Chief Justice Gilfillan in State v. Young, see note 395 supra
and reiterated in numerous decisions, see for instance State v. Hense, 135
Minn. 99, 103, 160 N. W. 198, 200 (1916); Niemo v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn. 263, 271, 35 N. W. 2d 337, 340 (1948) ;
Juster v. Grossman, 229 Minn. 280, 287, 38 N. W. 2d 832, 836 (1949) ; State
v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 438, 42 N. W. 2d 25, 31 (1950) ; Norris Grain
Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91, 96, 46 N. W. 2d 94, 98
(1950) ; Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 324, 46 N. W. 2d 654, 658 (1951).
416. The court so far has not had occasion to rule on the question when
an application for the writ is premature, see State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 29, 30,
14 N. W. 58, 59 (1882).
417. Dayton v. Paine, 13 Minn. 493, 496 (1868).
418. State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 178, 99 N. W. 636 (1904) ; quoted
with approval in State v. Hense, 135 Minn. 99, 103, 160 N. W. 198, 200

(1916). Substantially identical statements can be found in Huhn v. Foley

Bros. Inc., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22' N. W. 2d 3, 8 (1946) and in Kienlen v.
Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 142, 34 N. W. 2d 351, 354 (1948). See also State
v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 219, 233, 12 N. W. 2d 343, 345 (1943); Heinsch v.
Kirby, 222 Minn. 352, 355, 24 N. NV. 2d 493, 494 (1946) ; Juster v. Grossman,
229 Minn. 280, 288, 38 N. W. 2d 832, 836 (1949) ; State v. Enersen, 230
Minn. 427, 438, 42 N. W. 2d 25, 31 (1950) ; Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn.
320, 325, 46 N. W. 2d 654, 658 (1951).
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appointing a receiver or an unauthorized prohibitory injunction, at
least where the latter order was not filed and served prior to the
service of the alternative writ on the court. 410 The writ will likewise
not issue or be made absolute where the issues raised have become
moot as by dismissal of the proceedings upon settlement, by lapse
42 0
of time or because of other intervening events.
(b) The second of the accepted three requirements or essentials
for the issuance of the writ is "that it must appear that the exercise
of such [judicial or quasi-judicial] power by the court, officer or
person is unauthorized by law." According to a principle established by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court4 21 this lack of
authorization must be found in the conduct of proceedings by which
the tribunal either wholly "usurps" jurisdiction or "exceeds its
legitimate jurisdiction." 42 2 Matters which pertain to the propriety
of the tribunal's action otherwise than "in the jurisdictional sense"
419. State v. District Court, 204 Minn. 415, 283 N. W. 738 (1939)
(prohibition annulling appointment of ex parte receiver) ; Juster v. Grossman, 229 Minn. 280, 38 N. W. 2d 382 (1949) (writ made absolute annulling
an order by the district court restraining relator from taking depositions in
a wrongful death action). See also State v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 42
N. W. 2d 25 (1950) (prohibition against injunction pendente lite denied
because of harmful effects resulting from such annulment).
420. State v. District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, 141 Minn.
502, 170 N. W. 916 (1919); State v. Weeks, 230 Minn. 581, 41 N. W. 2d
177 (1950) ; In re Guardanship of Wolff, 232 Minn. 144, 148, 44 N. W. 2d
465, 467 (1950) ; State v. Wilson, 48 N. W. 2d 513 (Minn. 1951).
421. For cases laying down this principle, see particularly State v.
Wilcox, 24 Minn. 143, 147 (1877) ; State v. Municipal Court of St. Paul, 26
Minn. 162, 164, 2 N. W. 166, 167 (1879) ; State v. District Court for Ramsey
County, 26 Minn. 233, 234, 2 N. IV. 689, 700 (1879); State v. Young, 29
Minn. 474, 523, 9 N. W. 737, 738 (1881) ; State v. Cory, 35 Minn. 178, 28
N. W. 217 (1886) ; State v. Ward, 70 Minn. 58, 63, 72 N. W. 825 (1897) ;
State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 178, 99 N. W. 636 (1904) ; State v. Craig, 100
Minn. 352, 355, 111 N. W. 3, 5 (1907) ; State v. Hense, 135 Minn. 99, 103,
160 N. W. 198, 200 (1916) ; State v. District Court, 141 Minn. 1, 168 N. W.
634 (1918) ; State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W. 155 (1935) ;
State v. Laughlin, 204 Minn. 291, 293, 283 N. W. 395, 396 (1939) ; State
v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 219, 223, 12 N. W. 2d 343, 344 (1943); Huhn v.
Foley Bros. Inc., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N. W. 2d 3, 8 (1946) ; Heinsch v.
Kirby, 222 Minn. 352, 355, 24 N. W. 2d 493, 494 (1946) ; Nemo v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn. 263, 267, 35 N. V. 2d
337, 340 (1948) ; Juster v. Grossman, 229 Minn. 280, 288, 38 N. W. 2d 832,
836 (1949) ; Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn.
91, 98, 46 N. W. 2d 94, 99 (1950) ; Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 325,
46 N. W. 2d 654, 658 (1951); State v. Wilson, 48 N. W. 2d 513, 515
(Minn. 1951).
422. The somewhat artificial distinction between these alternatives
mentioned in a number of Supreme Court opinions commencing with State v.
Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 178, 99 N. W. 636 (1904) consists apparently in that in
the first case the tribunal is without authority to adjudicate the controversy or
matter before it generally and in its entirety, while in the second case there exists
authority in the premises, but the tribunal is temporarily without jurisdiction to
proceed or is without jurisdiction to include issues reserved to different author'ties or otherwise not properly before it. Thus the Supreme Court has issued
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are not subject to review on prohibition. 423 Thus proper causes for
an application for the writ are neither "mere" procedural defects
and irregularities 2 4 nor errors on the merits such as lack of evidence or the application of erroneous rules of law. 422 The lack of
jurisdiction which can be challenged by prohibition may be either
lack of jurisdiction over the person 426 or lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. 427 jurisdiction of the latter type has been found
lacking, for example, where commitment proceedings involved a
party not actually within the county boundaries, 4 - where proceedings for removal from office involved an official not subject
42
to the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal in question, where the matter was not subject to administrative intervention because of the lack of a controversy, 430 where a party resorted to a
a writ of prohibition to prevent the consideration of matters not affecting
a certain area, In re Judicial Ditch No. 9, 167 Minn. 10, 208 N. W. 417
(1918), and stated that a tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers by the
denial of a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, State v.
Wilson, 48 N. W. 2d 515 (Minn. 1951). Of course, the existence of a
particular issue may deprive a tribunal of its jurisdiction over the entire
controversy, cf. State v. Municipal Court of St. Paul, 26 Minn. 162, 2 N. W.
698 (1879) ; State v. Cory, 35 Minn. 178, 28 N. W. 217 (1886) ; State v.
Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 178, 99 N. W. 638 (1904).
423. Bellows v. Ericson, 233; Minn. 320, 325, 46 N. W. 2d 654, 658
(1951).
424. State v. Ward, 70 Minn. 58, 72 N. W. 825 (1897); State v.
Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 179, 99 N. W. 636 (1904) ; State v. Craig, 100 Minn.
352, 355, 111 N. W. 3, 5 (1907) ; It re Estate of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147,
210 N. W. 40 (1926) (wrong venue) ; State v. Laughlin, 204 Minn. 291,
283 N. W. 359 (1939) ; State v. District Court, 222 Minn. 546, 559, 25 N. W.
2d 692, 699 (1946).
425. State v. Craig, 100 Minn. 352, 111 N. W. 3 (1907) (sufficiency
of evidence) ; State v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 219, 222, 12 N. W. 2d 343, 344
(1943) ; Heinsch v. Kirby, 222 Minn. 352, 355, 24 N. W. 2d 343, 344 (1946);
State v. District Court, 222 Minn. 546, 553, 25 N. W. 2d 692, 696 (1946).
426. See, for instance, the discussion in State v. District Court for
Ramsey County, 26 Minn. 233, 2 N. W. 698 (1879) ; State v. Ward, 70 Minn.
58, 64, 72 N. W. 825, 826 (1897) (administrative proceedings); State v.
Laughlin, 204 Minn. 291, 293, 283 N. W. 395, 396 (1939) (criminal contempt) ; State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d 42 (Minn. 1951).
427. The traditional distinction between jurisdiction over the person
and jurisdiction over the subject matter is, of course, not a hard and fast one
and has become rather blurred in the light of recent federal cases involving
the due process and full faith and credit clauses. Yet our court still attaches
some practical significance to the classification; see Huhn v. Foley Bros.,
221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N. W. 2d 3, 8 (1946). See also the court's definition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter in Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91, 98, 46 N. W. 2d 94, 99 (1950). For an even
more questionable triple classification of jurisdiction see In re Guardianship
of Hudson, 226 Minn. 532, 537, 33 N. W. 2d 848, 852 (1948).
428. State v. Hense, 135 Minn. 99, 160 N. W. 198 (1916).
429. State v. Thompson, 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W. 887 (1904), see also
State v. Ward, 70 Minn. 58, 72 N. W. 825 (1897).
430. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227
Minn. 263, 35 N. W. 2d 337, 811 (1948).
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type of proceedings reserved for other categories of plaintiffs,4 31
where certain issues involved an area not included in special proceedings, 432 where the defendant in his official capacity was not
subject to orders by the judiciary,4 33 where the controversy involved interstate commerce4 34 or was otherwise subject to exclusive federal control. 435 It must be noted that the differentiation of
jurisdictional defects from mere non-jurisdictional irregularities
and other errors is susceptible to inherent difficulties and perplexities, since-as Justice Frankfurter has so pungently pointed out"'jurisdiction' competes with 'right' as one of the most deceptive of
legal pitfalls."' 36 Thus despite the fact that the court once broadly
stated that "whether there were fatal irregularities in the steps taken,
such as failure to give the notices required by statute, is not a question that can be reviewed in this manner" [italics added] ,437 it felt
subsequently compelled to scrutinize closely whether a procedural
omission or other defect went to the jurisdiction 48 and reached an
9
affirmative conclusion in cases of failure to give a statutory bond,'4
of abuse of discretion in the appointment of an ex parte receiver or
denial of a stay of the proceedings," 0 of judicial bias 41 and even of a
42
judge acting outside his district.
While ordinarily lack of jurisdiction should have been asserted
in the proceedings attacked by the application for the writ 443 this is
merely a rule of practice which might be dispensed with under
appropriate circumstances."'
(c) The last of the three essentials for the issuance of the writ
431. Kienlen v. Kienlen, 227 Minn. 137, 34 N. W. 2d 351 (1948).
432. In re Judicial Ditch No. 9, 167 Minn. 10, 208 N. W. 417 (1926).
433. State v. District Court, 141 Minn. 1, 168 N. W. 634 (1918).
434. Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91,
46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950), see also State v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 42 N. W.
2d 25 (1950).
435. Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. 279, 22 N. W. 2d 3 (1946) ; see
also State v. District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District Court of the
Twelfth Judicial District, 141 Minn. 502, 170 N. W. 916 (1919).
436. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S.685, 695 (1944).
437. State v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 179, 99 N. W. 636 (1904).
438. State v. District Court, 222 Minn. 546, 559, 25 N. W. 8d 692, 699,
(1946).
439. Bellows v. Erickson, 233 Minn. 320, 46 N. W. 2d 654 (1951).
440. State v. District Court, 200 Minn. 415, 283 N. W. 738 (1939);
State v. Wilson, 48 N. W. 2d 513 (Minn. 1951) (denial of stay under Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act).
441. Payne v. Ericson, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N. W. 2d 259 (1946) ; State v.
Beaudoin, 230 Minn. 186, 40 N. W. 2d 885 (1950).
442. State v. Johnson, 173 Minn. 271, 217 N. W. 351 (1927).
443. State v. Wilcox, 24 Minn. 143, 146 (1877).
444. State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 172, 262 N. W. 155, 156
(1935).
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is the requirement that it must appear that injury will result from
the threatened action and that there is no other adequate legal
remedy.
The presence or absence of this condition confronts the courts
frequently with complex and close problems. It early became apparent to the Supreme Court that the crucial question was not that of
the mere existence of any other form of relief or review but that of
the adequacy of such remedy. Thus the court stated in the early
case of State v. Wilcox

:44

"There are very few proceedings of a

judicial character in which a party aggrieved by a usurpation of
jurisdiction may not, either by some mode of review and correction, or by an action of trespass or otherwise, have an adequate
remedy for the wrong."'4 6 The court was keenly aware that if the
existence of any other remedy were a ground for the refusal of the
writ such rule "would almost entirely abolish the writ.

' 447

In a

search for a legitimate test as to when the availability of other usual
remedies, especially appeal, writ of error or certiorari, would preclude resort to the writ of prohibition, the court hit on the somewhat formal distinction between ordinary actions and extraordinary proceedings and held that the possibility of correction by appeal
or certiorari barred issuance of a writ of prohibition in the former
class of cases but not in the latter. 4 s Almost immediately thereafter, however, in reconsidering the matter Chief Justice Gilfillan
pointed out that the availability of the writ rested in the sound judicial
discretion of the court issuing it, depending upon the balance between the relator's interest in speedy relief against unauthorized
action and the general interest in an orderly administration of
justice which militates against the interruption and suspension of
proceedings in one tribunal to settle jurisdictional issues in another.449 He concluded that in application of this test "in general it

is a good reason for denying [the writ] that the party has a complete remedy in some other and more ordinary form. ' ' 410 As a re-

sult he ruled that the possibility of an appeal in an ordinary action
precluded the resort to the writ of prohibition.
The principle that prohibition is not a writ of right, but rests
in the sound discretion of the court has been reiterated many
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
166, 168
450.

State v. Wilcox, 24 Min. 143 (1877).
Id. at 147.
Ibid.
Ibid.
State v. Municipal Court of St. Paul, 26 Minn. 162, 164, 2 N. W.
(1879).
Ibid.
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times. 451 Obviously it is not the principle but its application in
various types of cases which is of professional interest.
The court has followed in many instances its rule that prohibition will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy by appeal
on which the jurisdictional issues can be raised.45 2 It has been articulate on the point that "[t] he fact that it may be less summary and
more expensive does not ipso facto render appeal inadequate. 4 5 3
In particular it has been held to militate against the issuance
of the writ where the question of jurisdiction depended on contested
factual issues.431 Yet the court, especially more recently, has
evinced a tendency to greater liberality and granted the writ several
times despite the availability of an appeal where the latter remedy
would have led to undue delay and circuity of action 5 or would have
caused the relator the loss of evidence or other particular harm.45 6
Conversely, the writ has been denied in an instance where the court
proceedings
felt that its issuance prior to the completion of the
457
in question would merely create a chaotic situation.
The court has followed the same principles which it laid down
451. State v. Hense, 135 Minn. 99. 103, 160 N. W. 198, 200 (1916);
In re Estate of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147, 148, 210 N. W. 40, 41 (1926);
Huh v. Foley Bros., Inc., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N. W. 2d 3, 8 (1946) ; State
v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 438, 42 N. W. 2d 25, 31 (1950).
452. State v. District Court of Ramsey County, 26 Minn. 233, 2 N. W.
698 (1879) ; State v. Cory, 35 Minn. 178. 28 N. W. 217 (1886) ; In re Estate
of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147, 210 N. W. 40 (1926) ; State v. Funck, 211 Minn.
27,299 N. W. 684 (1941) ; see also State v. Ferguson, 203 Minn. 603, 281 N. W.
765 (1938).
453. State v. Funck, 211 Minn. 27, 29, 299 N. W. 684, 685 (1941).
454. In re Estate of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147, 149, 210 N. XV. 40, 41
(1926). But cf. Norris Grain Company v. Seafarers' International Union,
232 Minn. 91, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950) (jurisdictional facts not traversed).
455. State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W. 155 (1935) (writ
granted restraining one district judge from interfering by injunction with
action pending in another district court) ; Huhn v. Foley Bros., Inc., 221
Minn. 279, 22 N. W. 2d 3 (1946) (prohibition restraining municipal court
from hearing matter within exclusive jurisdiction of a federal administrative
tribunal) ; State v. Schultz, 200 Minn. 363, 274 N. W. 401 (1937) (prohibition restraining judge from proceeding after filing of affidavit of prejudice) ;
Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N. W. 2d 259 (1946) (prohibition restraining
probate judge disqualified by reason of bias from proceeding).
456. State v. District Court, 204 Minn. 415, 283 N. W. 738 (1939)
(prohibition annulling ex parte appointment of receiver) ; Juster v. Grossman,
229 Minn. 280, 288, 38 N. W. 2d 832, 837 (1949) (prohibition against injunction proceedings restraining relator from taking a deposition) ; Norris Grain
Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91, 96, 46 N. W. 2d 94
(1950) (prohibition restraining the enforcement of a labor injunction);
Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 46 N. W. 2d 654 (1951) (prohibition restraining enforcement of mandatory injunction issued without bond).
457. State v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 441, 42 N. W. 2d 25, 33 (1950)
(denial of prohibition applied for to annul injunction issued pendente lite
concerning matters allegedly within exclusive jurisdiction of National Labor
Relations Board).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:435

with respect to appeals in deciding whether the availability of a review by means of certiorari would bar the granting of the writ of
prohibition. Thus it denied an application for the writ made for
the purpose of restraining the Industrial Commission from hearing
the merits of a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act
where the relator claimed lack of jurisdiction by reason of improper
service, because in the opinion of the court certiorari constituted an
adequate remedy in such case. 4'-8 But conversely it granted the writ
in another case involving commitment proceedings because it considered review by certiorari inadequate for the important reasons
that the personal freedom of the relator was at stake and that the
lack of jurisdiction was based cn facts dehors the record and therefore excluded from consideraticn by the court in certiorari proceed4 59
ings.
The availability of relief by means of the other extraordinary
remedies or special proceedings apparently has presented but few
difficulties to, and found little attention from, the court. On the one
hand it has permitted the challenge of proceedings before a judge
disqualified for prejudice by means of an application for the writ
of prohibition although "a more expeditious and suitable remedy"
was to be had by seeking a writ of mandamus ;460 on the other hand
it has ruled against the possibility of questioning the title to judicial
office by means of the writ of prohibition for the reason that the
writ of quo warranto was the proper remedy. 461 It is also perplexing
that in one case the court granted the writ of prohibition as the
proper means for challenging the unconstitutionality of judicial
proceedings for the incorporation of a village because of the lack
of another adequate remedy without even considering the appropriateness of such attack by quo warranto,4 62 despite the fact that
only shortly before when such proceedings had no safeguards of
judicial character it had referred to quo warranto as the method to
properly call in question the incorporation order.463 The judges,
however, have been prone to point at the availability of other relief
in cases where they denied the writ for other reasons, such as
404
absence of a judicial or quasi-judicial character.
458.
459.
460.
Beaudoin,
461.
Beaudoin,
462.
463.
464.

(1886).

State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d 42 (Minn. 1951).
Statev. Hense, 135 Minn. 99, 103, 160 N. W. 178,200 (1916).
Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N. W. 2d 259 (1946); State v.
230 Minn. 186, 40 N. W. 2d 885 (1950).
State v. McMartin, 42 Minn. 30, 43 N. W. 572 (1889); State v.
230 Minn. 186, 40 N. W. 2d 885 (1950).
State v. Simons, 32 Minr 540, 21 N. W. 50 (1884).
State v. Ueland, 30 Mimi. 29, 14 N. W. 58 (1882).
See, for instance, State v. Ostrum, 35 Minn. 480, 29 N. W. 585
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The last problem to be discussed in connection with the essential that there must be no other adequate legal remedy available to
the applicant for a writ of prohibition is the interrelation between
that writ and the injunction. Strangely enough no case in this
state has been found in which the Supreme Court considered this
problem. An appropriate occasion for a discussion of this point
would have been the above mentioned case of Nemo v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556.465 In that case a local
A.F. of L. union which had tried to negotiate an agreement with
an employer but did not claim to represent the majority of the employees in his enterprise procured a writ of prohibition restraining
the State Labor Conciliator from holding an election to determine
whether or not the relator was the proper collective bargaining agent
for said employees. The court held the action of the labor conciliator
in ordering and holding an election was both quasi-judicial in nature
and in the instant case in excess of his jurisdiction, since no controversy over the proper bargaining representative existed. It also
found that there was a substantial threat of injury to the relator because of the loss of prestige among the employees following an
adverse election and that no other adequate remedy at law was available for the prevention of such harm. 4 , No specific mention was

made of the possibility of an irjunction against the state labor
conciliator and the hostile employer, except, perhaps, for a vague
reference to "circuity of action. ' 467 It is true that injunctive relief

had been denied in a somewhat analagous previous case 466 involving
a labor election, but the reason for that refusal was that under the
particular circumstances of that controversy the petition for a
temporary restraining order was premature. Perhaps the true reason for allowing resort to the writ of prohibition in many instances
despite the availability of an injunction is the fact that the writ
of prohibition brings the matter immediately to the Supreme Court,
constitutes a direct attack""° on the proceedings in question and thus
brings the controversial "jurisdictional" issues to a swift and final
solution. If the jurisdictional matter involves the trial of factual
questions the injunction might, however, be the proper remedy.
465. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local Union No. 556, 227
Minn. 263, 35 N. W. 337, 811 (1948).
466. Id. at 271, 35 N. W. 2d at 342.
467. Id. at 272, 35 N. W. 2d at 342.
468. Quest Foundry Co. v. International Mfolders & Foundry Workers
Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N. W. 2d 32 (1944).
469. Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91,
98, 46 N. W. 2d 94, 99 (1950) ("prohibition is always a direct attack").
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In that connection it must be added that the writ of prohibition
not only resembles in some aspects the writ of certiorari as was
mentioned in the beginning of this installment'" but that it possesses
also some similarity to an injunction against proceedings. True,
the injunction is normally addressed only to the party and not the
tribunal, while the writ of prohibition is directed to both the court
and the party. But the courts have frequently been inclined to
minimize the consequences following from that distinction. Thus our
Supreme Court has on the one hand quoted with approval a pronouncement by the Court of Appeals of New York stating that the
writ of prohibition "is in effect an'injunction against a court. ' ,1 On
the other hand, it has also recognized that an injunction while not an
order running against a court "effectively restrains action."4 72 Yet,

even if one should agree with Justice Cardozo's vigorous assertion
that "the reality of the distinction [between the two remedies because of the difference in the addressees] has illustration in a host
of cases

' 473

this distinction fades away in the case of an administra-

tive body or tribunal whose conStitutents themselves may be the addressees of an injunction.4 7 4 Thus it seems that, especially in cases
of administrative proceedings, an injunction may or may not be
an adequate remedy barring -:he writ of prohibition depending
primarily upon the urgency for an intervention by the Supreme
Court itself and the nature of the issues in question.
C. ProceduralAspects

In Minnesota the power to issue writs of prohibition is vested
exclusively in the Supreme Court.4 7 5 Proceedings of this kind are
"original proceedings" based on the constitutional clause which
grants the Supreme Court "original jurisdiction in such remedial
cases as may be prescribed by law.'

476

Since the constitutional pro-

hibition against jury trial in the Supreme Court 477 applies also to
470. Supra text to note 381.
471. Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91,
95, 46 N. W. 2d 94, 99 (1950).
472. State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 174, 262 N. W. 155, 157
(1935).
473. Steelman v. All Continent Co., 301 U. S. 278, 291 (1937).
474. Cf. Quest Foundry Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N. W. 2d 32 (1944).
475. Minn. Stat. §§ 480.04, 587.01 (1949).
476. Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 7. For recent statements in the reports
classifying applications for the writ of prohibition as original proceedings see,
for instance, Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 321 (1951) ; State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d 42 (Minn. 1951).
477. Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 2.
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its original jurisdiction4 7 8 it is recognized that all issues in prohibi47
tion cases should be decided upon affidavits. 1
The statutes contain detailed provisions for the applicable practice.4'0 The writ is applied for upon affidavit by motion to the court
or a judge thereof in vacation.481 The writ is directed to the court
are engaged in the proceedings to be reand party or officer who
482
strained or annulled.
4
The writ is first issued in a "temporary" ("preliminary") 83
form, usually designated as an "alternative writ, ' 48 4 and contains
an order restraining further proceedings by respondents until
further order coupled with an order to show cause why the writ
should not be made absolute.'" The writ is served upon the addressees in the same manner as a writ of mandamus. 86 The court
or the officer named ought to be identified by its official designation;
if the officer is an administrative board its correct designation as,
not the names of its members,
for instance, Industrial Commission,
487
should properly be selected.
The court or officer to whom the writ is directed is under a duty
to make a return.4 8 The party as such is not required or permitted
to make a return. He is only permitted to adopt the return of the
court or tribunal, but not required to do so."'8 He is, however, under
a practical necessity of seeing to it that a return is made. If he fails
to do so and no return is made, the Supreme Court will decide the
question of whether or not the alternative writ should be made abso478. Harkins v. Board of Supervisors, 2 Minn. 342 (1858) ; Prignitz v.
Fisher, 4 Minn. 366 (1860) ; see also supra text to note 36.
479.
Davidson,
480.
481.
482.
483.

Prignitz v. Fisher, 4 Minn. 366 (1860) ; see also It re Estate of
16S Minn. 147, 149, 210 N. W. 40, 41 (1926).
Minn. Stat. § 587.01 (1949).
Ibid.
Ibid.
The terms "temporary" and "preliminary" writ were used in older

cases, see for instance State v. Peers, 33 Minn. 81, 21 N. W. 860 (1885) ; State
v. Ostrum, 35 Minn. 480, 29 N. W. 585 (1886).
484. Minn. Stat. § 587.02 (1949) mentions "The first or alternative
writ." The latter designation is found in a host of cases extending to date,
,ee for instance State v. Thompson, 91 Mnin. 279, 97 N. W. 887 (1904);

State v.Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, at 438, 42 N. W. 2d 25, at 31 (1950).

485. Minn. Stat. § 587.01 (1949).
486. Minn. Stat. § 587.02 (1949).
487. See State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d 42 (Minn. 1951)
Dayton v. Paine, 13 Minn. 493, 496 (1868).
488. Minn. Stat § 485.02 (1949) ; see also Dayton v. Paine, 13 Minn.
493, 496 (1868) ; State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 172, 262 N. W. 155,
156 (1935).
489. Dayton v. Paine, 13 Minn. 493, 496 (1868) ; State v. District Court,
195 Minn. 169, 172, 262 N. W. 155, 156 (1935).
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lute according to the showing made by the original application.490
Of course, the court or officer and the party are entitled to file
' 1 As
separate briefs and to be heard separately on oral argument.4
stated before, if a return is made and issue is joined upon such re4 2
turn the case must be decided upon proof by affidavits. 11

If the hearing upon the order to show cause convinces the court
that there is no lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that there is another adequate remedy or that the issuance of the writ will create
chaos or that the issues have become moot, the writ will not be made
absolute. The final disposition in such case will be an order quashing or discharging the alternative writ, i.e., both the temporary
restraining order and the order to show cause.4 3 Conversely, if the
hearing on the order to show cause leads the court to the conclusion
that the writ should be made absolute, the court will issue a final
order to that effect and annul all or any of the proceedings as to
which there was lack or excess of jurisdiction. 49The statute provides that "The court may make and enforce
such order concerning costs and disbursements, and the amount
thereof, as justice shall require.'

95

This provision was construed

as leaving to the sound discretion of the court whether costs and disbursements should be taxed "-o the prevailing party.498 Although
ordinarily the court has taxed costs and disbursements to the prevailing party it has not taxed costs and disbursements against either
party when both of them prevailed to some extent 497 and not to the
prevailing party where the application was justified when made, although the issues became subsequently moot, 498 or in other cases
490. State v. District Court, 195 Minn. 169, 172, 267 N. W. 155, 156
(1935).
491. See the implicit approval of this practice in Nemo v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn. 263, 35 N. W. 2d 811, 812
(1948).
492. See supra text to note 478.
493. According to Minn. Stat. § 587.04 (1949) "The final order if it be
against the relator, shall authorize further proceeding as if the first or alternative writ had not issued." The court's formula varies slightly, see for instance
State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1951) ("The
alternative writ is quashed and the order to show cause discharged") ; State
v. Wilson, "48 N. W. 2d 513, 515 (Minn. 1951) (order to show cause is discharged) ; State v. Weeks, 230 Minn. 581, 41 N. W. 2d 177 (1950) ("The
writ is discharged") ; State v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 442, 42 N. W. 2d 25,
33 (1950) ("Writ discharged").
494. Minn. Stat. § 587.05 (1949).
495. Ibid.
496. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn.
263, 272, 35 N. W. 2d 811, 812 (1948).
497. Ibid.
498. State v. Wilson, 48 N. Mr.2d 513, 515 (Minn. 1951).
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where such arrangement appeared to the court as required by justice.4 ' The court or officer involved is not liable for costs and
disbursements.500
499. See for example State v. Industrial Commission, 48 N. W. 2d
42, 44 (MIinn. 1951) ; Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 330, 46 N. W. 2d
654, 661 (1951).
500. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local No. 556, 227 Minn.
263, 272, 35 N. W. 2d 811 (1948).

